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Abstract: Our aim in this article is to put into 
practice, in the field of social sciences, the 
principles that Husserl displayed in his book 
from 1936, "The crisis of European sciences and 
transcendental phenomenology”. In that semi-
nal work, Husserl reflected on the 
mathematization of nature and produced an 
historical meditation on the essence of geome-
try.  Here we will try to extend the reach of 
Husserlian postulates in order to deal with eco-
nomics and, more specifically, with the theory 
of money. We think that, in certain social sci-
ences, and in particular in those with a clear 
mathematical penchant like economics, the use 
of formalization often helps to cover an uncriti-
cal use of phenomenologically ungrounded 
idealizations. This fact ultimately results in a 
massive concealment of the true sense of some 
of its principal phenomena –namely, money. It 
is worth mentioning that this concern does not 
have its roots only in phenomenology, for even 
academic monetary theory openly acknowledg-
es that we lack an understanding of the mean-
ing of money which could help us clarify and 
prevent financial crisis and economic collapses. 
Crisis, in short, are not the result of a deep 
understanding of the concept of money; on the 
contrary, they highlight the fact that we don’t 
really know what money is. Thus, our goal here 
is to illustrate the possibilities offered by the 
phenomenological method in its application to 
the question of money.  It is in this sense that 
the research taking place here can be under-
stood as a “phenomenological cri-
tique of monetary theory”.  
 
 
Key Words: Phenomenology of Money, Mone-
tary Theory, Medium of Exchange, Crisis of 
European Sciences. 
Resumen: En el presente artículo se pretende 
llevar a cabo una aplicación de los principios 
que Husserl lleva a cabo en su obra de 1936, 
“La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenome-
nología transcendental”, a las ciencias sociales; 
concretamente, al concepto de dinero. En su 
obra de 1936, Husserl puso el énfasis en la 
matematización de la naturaleza, centrándose 
sobre todo en la meditación histórica sobre la 
geometría. Pero en el caso de algunas ciencias 
sociales, como la economía, la utilización libre 
de construcciones idealizadoras fenomenológi-
camente infundadas, como en el caso del dine-
ro, está teniendo como resultado un enorme 
encubrimiento de sentido del fenómeno mone-
tario. Esto no es vivido tan solo desde la feno-
menología: desde la propia teoría monetaria se 
reconoce que estamos faltos de una compren-
sión del sentido del dinero que nos ayude a 
clarificar y prevenir de manera suficiente las 
crisis financieras. Estas crisis no son fruto de 
que hayamos comprendido demasiado bien el 
concepto de dinero, sino de que todavía esta-
mos faltos de una comprensión profunda del 
sentido del dinero. Aquí pretendemos ilustrar 
las posibilidades que el método fenomenológico 
ofrece, aplicado al caso del dinero. En este 
sentido, pueden considerarse las investigacio-
nes que tienen lugar aquí como “crítica feno-
menológica de la teoría monetaria”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Palabras clave: Fenomenología del dinero, 
teoría monetaria, medio de cambio, crisis de las 
ciencias europeas. 
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1. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Our aim in this paper is to apply some of the most important elements of 
the phenomenological critique to the scientific notion of “objectivity”, such as it 
can be found in “The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology” to the field of monetary theory. It is known that Husserl devoted 
himself specially to the analysis of the constitution of modern physics, as a ba-
sis of the natural sciences1, and to the constitution of psychology as a natural 
science, due to its peculiar relation to transcendental phenomenology2, leaving 
aside the foundations of many other sciences that did not require a special 
treatment in a piece of work of a general character3. On the other hand, the 
references in the work of Husserl to economy as science are non-existent4. In 
the context of this paper, our aim is to present the elements of a phenomeno-
logical critique to money using the methodological concept of “model”. 
It is a commonplace to virtually all economic textbooks to understand the 
definition of money within what might be called a “functional definition”. There 
is an expression that has made fortune in this respect: money is what money 
does5. Accordingly, money is “anything” capable of carrying out the well-known 
four following functions: 
● UNITY OF ACCOUNT: Money provides a measure or homogeneous pattern in 
which to express debts, prices and the general power of acquisition in establish-
ing equivalences between cash and property.  
● MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE: Money can be exchanged for other goods. In this 
sense, money is a commodity that is constituted as a medium of exchange 
commonly accepted in indirect exchanges6. 
 
 
1 Hua VI, § [9], etc.  
2 Hua VI, § [57], [58].  
3 The theory of science of Ideen III, according to which regional ontologies depend on the theory of 
apprehensions seems to exclude a differentiated phenomenological foundation for the social sciences; 
see Hua V, § [4]. 
4 Some attempts to advance in the direction of integrating the foundations of the theory of the life-world 
and the foundations of economy are offered in a dispersed fashion, without a systematic impulse, for 
example, in Stikkers (1985). 
5 Hicks, 1967, p. 1.  
6 As “direct exchange” we mean the primary model of barter exchange, “piece by piece” constituted 
upon the spontaneous coincidence of interests in relation to the goods that the agents need and the 
goods they want to get rid of: the goods I possess and do not need coincide with the ones the other 
possesses and does not need. The exchange is indirect when buying goods, not based on a coincidence 
of direct interests, but to have access in a future exchange to other goods that are not 
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● MEANS OF PAYMENT: Money is used to settle liabilities or debts to individu-
als or institutions. For example, we use money to pay taxes. 
● STORE OF WEALTH: Money allows you to maintain your purchasing power 
from present to future. As a store of wealth it is deficient against future price 
increases, because this purchasing power may decrease, but in principle it 
serves to accumulate purchasing power in future situations7. 
In a first analysis of this traditional functional definition we will readily find 
the following problematic aspects:       
1. Most formulations talk about “anything”. It does not matter whether it is 
this or that, but there has to be “something”8.  At first sight, this might be 
without interest, but later it will appear to have important ramifications.  
2. This “thing” has historically been interpreted most times as something 
which belongs to the region “physical thing” (a commodity). 
3. In the history of economic thought, the function that has been tradition-
ally privileged as primary function is the medium of exchange function. 
4. This predominance of the medium of exchange function has been ac-
companied by a genetic conception of all other forms of money (fiat money, 
electronic money, etc.) from this “money-thing”. 
We can call the set of conditions (2)-(4) as the foundation of what in con-
temporary monetary theory has been called “orthodox analysis”9, a scholarly 
historical construct that some make it go back to the first description about the 
origins of money in Aristotle10, up until the modern quantitatively theory of 
 
 
phenomenologically present. The indirect exchange is an exchange that involves mediation between the 
good one gets rid of and the good that one acquires. For this distinction, see Von Mises, 2007, p. 4 et 
seq.  
7 Sawyer, in Rochon-Rossi (eds.), 2003, p. 4, distinguishes between “store of wealth” and the classic 
“store of value”. The classic “store of value” is practically synonymous with the establishment of com-
modity money or what is the same thing, the acceptance (in a short period of time) that if I keep a 
commodity I do not wish, and the others do the same, it might be used as a commonly accepted medi-
um of exchange. Accordingly, the medium of exchange is based on store value, which is different from 
the accumulation of this commodity as a “store of wealth”. This difference will be important later on; see 
XX (full text). 
8 Quite often, the ontological concept of “thing” is replaced by other expressions that designate this 
specific character in the technical language of some science; similar or equivalent expressions, such as 
“everything that…”, or technical concepts such as “assets” or “property”, etc. In any case, there is a 
reference to the concept of “something”, the concept of “entity”, and this is commonly expressed in 
these definitions under the formula “anything”. 
9 Ingham, 2004, p. 28; Smithin, 2000, p. 3; Fontana & Vera, in Rochon (ed.), 2003, p. 59; Wray, in 
Smithin, 2000, p. 42.  
10 Schumpeter, 1995, p. 100. 
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money, which is based on understanding money as a stock that is independent 
of demand11. 
But if we have a closer look at the definition, the association between the 
set of conditions (2)-(4) and (1) is by no means a necessary association. The 
fact that money has to be “something” (condition 1) does not necessarily mean 
that money has to be something belonging to the region “physical thing” (con-
dition 2). It does not mean, either, that out of the four functions, the primary 
function that has to bear this “something” must be the “medium of exchange” 
function (condition 3). This set of associations have been carried out naturally 
by both classical and neoclassical economists and popular thought that have 
always started the genesis of money from the idealized imaginary construct of 
barter. In the idealized imaginary construct of barter, the medium of exchange 
function and the constitution of a commodity (a “physical thing”) that plays the 
role of money appear as necessarily related12. In contrast, the rest of the func-
tions seem to be able to be carried out more effectively by other entities that 
do not have to necessarily belong to the region “physical thing” at first sight: in 
principle, it seems quite intuitive to accept that the function “unity of account” 
can be better carried out by means of abstract entities than by means of physi-
cal things13; regarding the function of “means of payment”, a payment is a can-
celation of an obligation, and therefore it is constituted upon a speech act, 
whereupon physical money is nothing else than a constitutive possible but not 
necessary element; and regarding the function of store of wealth, a deposit is 
an entity that exists independently of the physical existence of the money that 
constitutes it, as long as it is a pure representation of money14. 
The comprehension of the functional definition of the orthodox analysis 
seems to follow the foundational sequence   (3)       (2) – (1)      (4). This is 
 
 
11 That is to say, in understanding money as an exogenous variable of economic systems; see Bailly and 
Gnos, in Piégay-Rochon, 2006, p. 220. This is obviously a simplification, a historical “cliché”, about which 
much more should be said, but it can be considered as a common element of all the special features of 
this scholar construct an exogenous concept of money, which leads to the axiom of the neutrality of 
money. 
12 The classic presentation of the theory of the genesis of money as commodity money and the medium 
of exchange function would be the one by Menger (see Ingham, in Smithin, 2000, p. 17 et seq.); but in 
Aristotle’s analysis in Politics the basic conditions of the narrative are already fixed: money is constituted 
by the need of exchange, in order to speed the process and make it easier. This is the genesis of money 
that will give rise to the famous metaphor of money as a “lubricant” of exchanges, the source of all ex-
ogenous concepts of money and all theories of money as a commodity.  
13 The circuit theorist Bernard Schmitt pointed out that money “is itself constituted by pure numbers, not 
at all a commodity, gold or silver… cash, rightly understood, is nothing but money in purely arithmetical 
variable quality; see Schmitt, in Piégay-Rochon, 2006, p. 186. 
14 See B. Smith, in Koepsell & Moss, 2003, p. 287 et seq. 
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crucial because it involves that the understanding that money has to be “some-
thing” is read in light of the constitution of the function of medium of exchange. 
It is the constitution of the medium of exchange function that will guide the 
way in which to understand what is meant by the ontological concept of “thing” 
within the framework of the definition of money. The story of the constitution of 
the function of medium of exchange that the orthodox analysis carries out con-
sists in the idealized imaginary construction of barter15. The most important 
aspect of the imaginary construction of barter consists in that, as an idealized 
situation that constitutes the background of money, it prefigures an absolutely 
pure and spontaneous exchange, “empty” of institutional co-constitutive ele-
ments; that is to say, under the imaginary construct of barter lies the historical 
and logic “garden of Eden” of free market unregulated by state institutions16; 
money that spontaneously emerges from the free exchange of goods17. Obvi-
ously, the background in the constitution of this imaginary construct is not on-
tological; it is political. This political background prefigures an idealized world of 
pure and spontaneous exchanges empty of any legislation. The most proper 
being of human beings in this construct is the exchange, and the exchange is 
exchange of goods. The economic concept of “good” is the economic transcript 
of the ontological concept of “thing”, because “good” means “anything that can 
satisfy a need”. The “materializing” dimension of the concept of “good” as eco-
nomical version of the ontological concept of “thing” is so significant that its use 
is applied by Menger to the very definition of money: we will consider money 
“any good” that takes over the three classic functions (medium of exchange, 
measure of value and store of value, using Menger’s terminology). The consid-
eration of money as a good leads Menger so far as to specify the precise empir-
ical conditions that favor the election of a specific thing as money in relation to 
other things: durability, portability, divisibility, etc. are physical conditions that 
affect the greater liquidity (Absatzfähigkeit) of a thing and, therefore, facilitate 
its choice as money.  
 
 
15 The term “idealized imaginary construction” is no stranger to the characteristic methodological termi-
nology typical of the stories of orthodox analysis. Von Mises speaks of the method of imaginary con-
structions as the “most typical” of economy; see Von Mises, 2007, p. 288. 
16 The “fable of barter”, an expression by Servet (2001, p. 16 et seq.) or the “Mengerian myth”, an ex-
pression by Ingham (in Smithin, 2000, p. 24).  
17 How else would it be possible to obliterate the continuing emphasis of Menger in denying whatever 
trace of a contractual constitution of money? (Menger, 1997, page 325); “Money is not the result of a 
previous agreement of economic agents, and even less the result of legislative acts. It is neither an 
invention of peoples” (ibid., p. 327). See especially the long historical footnote on p. 323. 
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Therefore, the orthodox understanding of the functional definition starts 
from the constitution of the function of medium of change in an imaginary con-
struction of politically motivated barter (3); the constitution of this function in-
dicates the background upon which to understand the concept of “thing” (1), 
and this concept of “thing” is constituted as a “physical thing” (“good”, “com-
modity”) (2). 
It is important to point out that this association between aspect (1) and all 
aspects (2)-(4) of the functional definition of money has been a constant in the 
thematization of the ontology of money, at least up until the publication of 
Treatise on money by Keynes in 193018. By privileging the function of “unity of 
account” as a primary genetic function regarding the function of “medium of 
exchange”, Keynes opened up an absolutely new field for the treatment of the 
ontology of money, making it possible to break the association of aspects (2)-
(3) of the functional definition. If the primary genetic function, from which all 
others derive, consists in the function of unity of account, then we put our-
selves in the genetic context, in this case historical, of the institutional creation 
of money19. The recognition of the origin of money in account money grants a 
central role to the institution that computes money; to the institution that sets 
the first equivalences, which are performatively created by law20. Something 
similar occurs if we consider the function of means of payment as primary ge-
netic function: a payment, as a cancellation of an obligation, is in principle in-
dependent of whether this cancellation is carried out by means of an abstract 
quantification21. A payment is a constitutive element of a successful speech act, 
 
 
18 Keynes, 1971, p. 3. Clearly, the Treaty of Keynes did not fall from heaven. The conception of Keynes 
was very much influenced, especially, by the state theory of money of Knapp (Die Staatliche Theorie des 
Geldes, 1905).  
19 With regard to methodology, we are at the other end of the method of imaginary constructions. The 
most important record for us is the historical register in the field of historical data. This “historical trend” 
was already in Keynes, who talked about “Babylonian madness” to refer to the period of six years during 
which, in the decade of the 20s (the Treatise dates back to 1930), he devoted himself to the study of 
metrology and numismatics, and then it is mentioned by some post-Keynesian authors (Wray, 2003; 
Ingham, 2005). 
20 An example of this creation would be the model of the legal constitution of the silver shekel in Baby-
lon, which would not emerge from a commodity already in circulation, but as the basic unit of account 
established by the sovereign through law, from which equivalences are established: 1 shekel of silver 
(equivalent to approximately 8 g of silver) = 240 grains of barley.  
21 The question about what comes first regarding medium of exchange and unit of account is more com-
plex than it seems: if there is no quantification we cannot talk about “payment” in the strict sense (see 
Polanyi, 1994, p. 186), but the recognition that there may be a cancellation of the obligation without 
quantification seems to place “means of payment” as the scope of the genesis of the unit of account. The 
problem is the ambiguity of the word “payment”: Polanyi restricts it to the use of money, but recognizes 
that in a broader sense, it is possible to cancel an obligation through actions such as courtship, mar-
riage, dancing, singing, dressing, celebrating, mourn lacerations and even suicide. In these cases there 
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and therefore has its origin in a constituent context of speech acts (promises, 
obligations, debts, etc.), not in an exchange of goods. Obviously, both a com-
modity as an arithmetic variable and a speech act are “something”, that is, they 
can be, at any given time, the “thing” of the aspect (1) of the functional defini-
tion, based on the theory of the genesis of the functions we choose. 
In this paper, we propose to carry out a phenomenological critique to the 
idealization processes by means of which the orthodox analysis (which starts all 
the functions of money from the medium of exchange function) intends to base 
its whole conception of money. What we want to reveal is how the price paid to 
demonstrate the possibility of the emergence of a medium of exchange in 
properly modeled worlds consists in losing, perhaps irreversibly, the possibility 
of implementing this “artificial” medium of exchange in the life-world. 
In order to develop this phenomenological critique we draw on the flagship 
model for the orthodox analysis in the last 20 years. We refer to the Kiyotaki-
Wright model on the emergence of the medium of exchange. We proceed first 
to a brief exposition of its most important elements, so as to carry out a meth-
odological critique based on the restrictions that a foundation on the life-world 
would impose on the modeling of worlds, if we were not to miss the more fun-
damental conditions of meaning. 
 
1. The Kiyotaki-Wright model as a model of emergence of the means of ex-
change. 
The Kiyotaki-Wright model (from now on, KW) is built, from the usual con-
ditions in this type of theoretical entities, starting from the following set of ele-
ments:  
1. Three distinguishable types of goods, indicated by Arabic numerals, 1, 2 
and 3. All goods are stored at a certain cost, but each agent can store only 
one good at every turn, since the goods are indivisible. The storage costs 
must be specified according to the good (according to its intrinsic proper-
ties) and according to the type of agent (according to the technology used 
for storage)22. With the expression cij we refer to the cost of storage of 
 
 
is cancelation of obligations owed to society, but no quantification. It is the context of the complexity of 
the cancellation of obligations what leads to the formation of the unit of account as a legal means of 
cancellation of obligations. 
22 More advanced versions of the model surpass the specification of the cost of storage according to the 
type of agent, being limited to the proper specifications of the type of good; see Elendner, 2009, p. 31.  
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good j for the type i. It is assumed that the costs of storage of goods are 
structured in the following way: ci3 > ci2 > ci1 > 0, for all i.  
2. Three types of agents, whose lifespan is infinite, indicated by means of Ro-
man numbers I, II and III23. When we refer to a token agent (of whatever 
type) or to a token of one of the three types we denote it with the lower 
case letter i. The agents do not obtain utility for the consumption of the 
good that they produce, and they do not produce those goods that they 
wish to consume.24 
3. For a given agent i, the expression Ui refers to the instantaneous utility that 
results from consumption of the good i. The expression Di denotes the re-
sulting instantaneous desutility of producing the good i*. The net utility of 
consuming and replacing a well suited unit for a produced good is ex-
pressed as ui = Ui – Di.  
4. The initial movement in the model can be introduced by means of two pos-
sible specifications, which correspond to the combinatory between con-
sumption and production according to the type of agents and the intrinsic 
proprieties of the goods. In model A the agents of type I produce the good 
2, the agents of type II produce the good 3 and the agents of type III pro-
duce the good 1. In model B, the agents of type I produce the good 3, the 
agents of type II produce the good 1 and the agents of type III produce the 
good 2. If we express the two possible combinations between the distribu-
tion of the types of agents-goods and the intrinsic proprieties of goods by 
means of a table, we obtain the following: 
 
 
Agent 
Consumes 
(models A 
and B) 
Produces 
(model A) 
Produces  
(model B) 
 
Type I 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Type II 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
Type III 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
23 We will closely deal with the a priori surprising incorporation of the immortality of the agents as a 
condition for the coherent development of the model. 
24 The probability of obtaining an agent of a particular selected type at random is uniformly distributed,, 
since the proportion of agents per type is the same; see KW, 1989, p. 930. 
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5. Agents find themselves at each turn randomly in pairs, and must decide 
whether they will carry out the exchange or not. The exchange always in-
volves a trade-off one by one, among the inventories of the agents, and 
only occurs if both agree. There is, therefore, no centralized market, and no 
common space in which goods of the three types are found simultaneously. 
There is no credit either, since the probability of a pair of agents to meet 
again is cero25. Since time is discreet, it is structured in turns26. In a turn, 
an agent can produce the good that corresponds to him and consume (if he 
has it) its corresponding good of consumption. Otherwise, he ought to store 
the good at the corresponding price. In this way, each agent can store only 
one good at every turn: if he does not consume it, he will have to wait for 
his turn without producing a new one.  
6. Agents follow a set of rational strategies based on the desire to maximize 
their expected utility. These strategies can be represented by a set of bina-
ry variables:i(j, k) = 1 expresses that the strategy of agent i consists in 
exchanging the good j, which he has in his inventory, for the good k, which 
is in the inventory of the agent with whom he came across; i(j, k) =0 indi-
cates that the agent i does not want to carry out the exchange. If we ex-
press this from the couple of agents:  
i(j, k) · h(k, j) = 1, 
it indicates that the exchange is carried out, where i and h are agents and 
the first and the second letter in parenthesis designate the good of one’s 
own inventory and the other’s own inventory, respectively.  
7. Given these elements, it would be possible to determine the probability that 
an agent who has adopted, on a previous turn, a strategy i(j, k) = 1, 
found himself with another agent that allows him to carry out an exchange. 
To calculate this probability we need to know the proportion p of agents i in 
possession of the good j in their inventory at time t; that is to say, pij(t). 
 
 
25 KW, 1989, p. 931.  
26 Time is not a discrete variable in the life-world. Between two observable values (two seconds, for 
example) there can always be at least potentially a potential non-observable value. Being constituted 
upon a model of meetings, the KW model requires a structure in turns, and therefore time must be rep-
resented as a discreet variable, eliminating all intermediate lapses between turns, that then become 
non-meaningful for the explanatory needs of the model.   
206 JOAN GONZÁLEZ GUARDIOLA 
 
 206 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
The probabilities of transition from one encounter to another depend on the 
conditions of pij(t) on a given time; therefore, p(t) = (pij(t)), where p sig-
nals the matrix of the transition of probabilities27.  
8.  From this description of the surroundings and the rationality of the agents, 
the model provides the definition of what is meant by “equilibrium”. The 
conception of equilibrium that underlies the KW model is a Nash equilibri-
um28:   
    “A stationary equilibrium of Nash is a set of strategies of exchange 
one for each type i, with a stationary distribution of inventories p, satisfying: 
a. Maximization: every token i chooses to maximize its expected util-
ity given the strategies of others and distribution p; 
b. Rational expectations: given , p is a resulting stationary dis-
tribution”.29 
The KW model pretends to find situations of equilibrium from these sur-
rounding and behavioral conditions of the agents. According to this, the matrix 
of the exchanges in the first encounter can be traced as follows: 
   
                    II                                     III                                I                                                
            3            1                          1             2                  2              3        
 
    2                     3       3             1   1           
                                         
I                                                                        II  II III          
 
    3            1       1    2   2                       
 
                      
            I finds II                           II finds III                     III finds I         
       
where letter T signals that there will be an exchange, and letter N signals that 
there will be no exchange. In the first case (an encounter between a type I 
 
 
27 The transition matrix indicates the probability that the next possible state of the stochastic process is 
one determined in accordance with the determination of the present state. The mathematical basis of 
the KW model basically consists in methods of dynamic programming and optimal control; in this case 
Markov chains are applied.  
28 In his general definition, a Nash equilibrium is one in which each player (a) knows and has adopted 
the best strategy; (b) knows the strategies of others. Therefore, all players put into practice (and know 
they do) the strategy that maximizes his profits given the strategies of others. Therefore, no player has 
incentives to individually modify his strategy. Nash equilibrium is not the best overall result for all partic-
ipants; it is just the best outcome for each of them, individually.  
29 KW, 1989, p. 932.  
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agent and a type II agent), the rows indicate the possibility that I possesses 
good 2 or good 3, and the columns signal the possibility that II possesses good 
3 or 1. If agent I possesses good 2 and agent II possesses good 1, then there 
is a double coincidence of wants, and the exchange will always occur. We recall 
the condition of the exchange: 
i(j, k) · h(k, j) = 1 
and if we specify it in the present situation, we can write: 
I(2, 1) · II(1, 2) = 1. 
 
Let us recall that agents of type I consume 1, agents of type II consume 2 
and agents of type III consume 3. 
Let us look instead to what happens if agent I possesses good 3 and agent 
II good 3 (or, simply, in all cases in which the two agents at the meeting pos-
sess the same type of good). In these cases, the exchange will never occur; 
indeed: 
I(3, 3) · II(3, 3) = 0. 
What happens in the other cases; that is to say, in the cases in which the 
agent I possesses good 2 and agent II possesses good 3, on the one hand, and 
the case in which the agent I possesses good 3 and agent II possesses good 1?  
 
I(2, 3) · II(3, 2) = ? 
I(3, 1) · II(1, 3) = ? 
In these cases, the exchange can occur or not, depending on the strategy 
chosen by the agents. If we consider that agents will always prefer to trade 
with goods that have a lower cost of storage, and recall that we provided stor-
age costs as follows: ci3 > ci2 > ci1 > 0, we can conclude that if agent I pos-
sesses a good 2 he will not trade it for a good 3, which implies a higher cost of 
storage. The same can be said of the agent II when he possesses a good 1, 
which has storage costs than 3. Therefore: 
 
I(2, 3) · II(3, 2) = 0 
I(3, 1) · II(1, 3) = 0 
 
Incorporating logical storage costs to decision-making strategies, we have 
the complete matrix of the first exchanges in model A: 
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                     II                                     III                                I                                                
             3            1                         1             2                 2              3        
 
    2                     3       3             1   1             
                                         
I                                                                        II  II III          
 
    3            1       1    2   2                       
 
               I finds II                         II finds III                     III finds I 
 
Let us take for instance the matrix of the encounters between the agent 
type II and agent type III. In this case, if agent II possesses good 3, he will 
want to exchange it for good 1, since the former implies a lower storage cost. 
But agent III will also want to exchange it, since good 3 is the good he con-
sumes. Therefore, the exchange will occur: 
 
II(3, 1) · III(1, 3) = 1.    
 
The matrix of this entire array of encounterings can in turn be represented 
by the following scheme, which displays the fundamental equilibrium: 
 
               
                                                I 
         
                                       1 2 
                                
                                              1 
                               II            3                        III   
 
 
Let us notice that type II agents end up acting as intermediaries accepting 
good 1 from agents of type III to exchange it for good 2 of agents of type I. 
This implies that good 1 is the good that emerges as a means of exchange from 
the behavior of agents of type II. This equilibrium is considered fundamental 
because the strategies from which it is obtained are “fundamental”: that is, the 
agents consider only the criterion of cost of storage (remember: ci3 > ci2 > ci1 
> 0) with the exception of a situation in which the greater cost of storage is its 
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own consumer good. The model KW deals in a differentiated fashion with an-
other kind of equilibrium, speculative equilibrium, based on speculative strate-
gies. One strategy is speculative when, besides the above-mentioned “funda-
mental” criteria (storage costs and consumer good), the criterion of the proba-
bility of getting rid of an unwanted good in a smaller number of turns is added 
in spite of the fact that conserving it meant a greater storage cost. If we incor-
porate speculative strategies in addition to fundamental strategies, we obtain 
the speculative balance of model A, represented in the following scheme:  
 
                                                 I 
         
                                   1  2  3              3   1  
                                
                                             1 
                              II             3                      III    
 
  
, in which we can see how two goods that carry out the function of medium of 
exchange emerge: the goods of type 1 (that already emerged in the fundamen-
tal equilibrium, because agent II continued transferring good 1 from agent III 
to agent I), and the goods of type 3 (since now, incorporating speculative 
strategies, the agents of type I transfer good 3 from agent II to agent III). In 
this new equilibrium, agents of type I prefer the good of greater cost of storage 
(3) in relation to the lower-cost good (2) precisely because good 3 is easier to 
market; that is to say, it can be exchanged more easily if we bear in mind the 
probabilistic factor of encounterings. 
After a considerable number of turns, the following conclusion should fol-
low: 
 The good of type 1, in having less storage costs, should emerge as a 
medium of exchange. 
 The agents of type II are at a disadvantage because they produce the 
good 3 (the most expensive from the point of view of storage), which will only 
be accepted by agents of type III (who consume it directly). This is what will 
take them to use good 1 (produced by III) as a medium of exchange with the 
agents of type I. 
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 Some agents of type I might decide (if they adopt some speculative 
strategy) to store good 3 (with a greater cost of storage) in view of being able 
to directly carry out an exchange with agents of type III, without the need to 
go through the mediation of agents of type II. This would mean a speculative 
equilibrium whereby good 3 would also occasionally emerge as a medium of 
exchange. 
 
 
3. Phenomenological critique to the Kiyotaki-Wright model. Notes for a theory 
of money in the life-world. 
 
Theoretical economists that work using models are quite aware of the limi-
tations in scope that their methodology implies. What the model KW shows is 
that the emergence of a medium of exchange in an appropriately modeled situ-
ation is possible; that is to say, given an initial state of the stochastic process 
without the existence of any medium of exchange, the process will move to-
wards the emergence of at least one good that will play the role of medium of 
exchange. But it is necessary to reflect upon the way in which Kiyotaki and 
Wright have constructed their model; that is to say, about what factors it has 
been necessary to isolate in order to show the possibility of that emergence. 
With this, we intend to ponder about a capital methodological question: if the 
price paid in the way of the process of the isolation of factors and of idealization 
in the constitution of the modeled elements does not imply the loss of essential 
elements when it comes to understand the sense of the emergence of money. 
It is one thing to show that under certain conditions (although these conditions 
can never be given in the real world) the emergence of a medium of exchange 
would be possible; another is to understand the sense that the emergence of a 
medium of exchange has in general. Demonstrating that in a possible properly 
modeled world the emergence of a medium of exchange can be given through 
stochastic processes does not imply an advance when having to understand the 
meaning that the emergence of money might have in the real world. If some of 
the isolated factors in the constitution of initial elements was revealed as deci-
sive when having to understand the meaning of the emergence of money, 
maybe what is gained (the possibility of demonstrating the possibility of the 
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emergence of money in a possible world) might seem a much less attractive 
reward than we would have first imagined at a theoretical level. 
The architecture of the model Kiyotaki-Wright corresponds quite precisely 
with a type of theoretical entities that started to develop in the field of economy 
in the 70s. Although the concept of “model” was already frequently used in 
economy in the 20s with a generic and approximately equivalent meaning to 
the one of “theoretical construct”, starting from the 70s the word “model” came 
to mean a more specific and characteristic type of theory.30 First, these new 
models focus on the analysis of very specific issues, moving away from the will 
to generalize, which previous theoretical constructions that were also formaliz-
ing had, such as the Theory of General Equilibrium.31 In this sense, the model 
KW starts from the assumption that the distinctive trait of money is the medi-
um of exchange function, and any other function is immediately eliminated 
from the analysis. It could also be said that there is no theory of money in the 
model KW, but an “isolated” theory of the function of medium of exchange; and 
not of its meaning, but only of the confirmation of its apparition. On the other 
hand, the modeling of the initial conditions is carried out by means of informal 
language. In the model KW (and in the models in the new specific sense after 
the 70s) the formal model is integrated in a “history” that is presented by 
means of an informal language32. This story presupposes the description, in 
non-formal language, of modeling (by means of idealizing and isolating pro-
cesses) of three broad areas, almost always present in the constitution of such 
theoretical entities: 
1. The environment: The modeling of the environment is usually carried out 
by means of isolation and idealization processes. In the case of the model KW 
that concerns us here, the environment is specified as physical environment, so 
 
 
30 On the distinctions between the generic use and the more technical concept of “model” in economics 
from the 70s, see Garcia-Bermejo, 2009, p. 90 et seq. While the word “model” was already frequently 
used, the new meaning derives rather from its verbal sense, “to model”, in the construction of entities 
designed to capture specific aspects of the market. 
31 Although there is no theory of money, in the strict sense, within the theory of General Balance, it can 
be argued that is a theory that tends to generalize and potential treatment of multiple issues.  
32 “Story” is the word that, not without derogatory overtones, tends to qualify the abundant description 
in informal language around the entire formalized exhibition of the model; see García-Bermejo, 2009, p 
96. Contrast, again (as does García-Bermejo) with a much more rigid conception of formalization of the 
theory of general balance, and with the methodological observation of Debreu about the complete domi-
nance of the syntactic over the semantic level in the theory: “Fidelity to rigor dictates the axiomatic form 
of the analysis where the theory, strictly speaking, is logically disconnected from its interpretations (see 
Debreu, 1973, p. x).      
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as to distinguish it from the modeling of behavioral aspects”33. However, in the 
description of the environment of the model KW we can distinguish some het-
erogeneity: 
a. On the one hand, space-time idealizations of the physical world, of 
the same type that would take place in the natural sciences. Thus, time is 
considered a discrete variable (when it is not in the life-world), and the 
spatial limitations of storage are fixed as an assumption34. In a certain 
sense, these idealizations are made to facilitate a simpler mathematical 
expression of the fundamental operations of the model. This sense of 
“idealization” is paralleled to the “neo-Duhemian” sense of idealization ac-
cording to which idealization is a method of transforming raw data; that is 
to say, a method of correcting systematic errors generated by devices of 
factual measurement35. Husserl also reflects this sense of “idealization” 
when he affirms that “the art of measurement becomes the precursor of 
at last universal geometry and its “world” of pure limit-forms”36. Nothing 
points to a problematization of this type of idealization, similar to the one 
physics carries out in the bodies that are given to it in sensible perception. 
b. On the other hand, the description of the characteristics of the 
agents also shapes the environment. And this description is not without 
interesting details. Why do agents have to be immortal? The model does 
not say anything in this respect. Obviously, the introduction of the immor-
tality of the agents in the constitution of the model (because it practically 
figures more as an introduction than as an isolation, since even if we all 
know in some way that we will die, we consider this aspect negligible in 
99% of our daily commercial exchanges)37 can be explained, as in the 
 
 
33 KW, 1989, pp. 930 – 931. Since there is no single pattern in the development of models, the word 
environment often includes both the physical description of the medium and the description of the mod-
eled behavior, without making any explicit difference; see García-Bermejo, 2009, p. 92.   
34 KW, 1989, p. 930.  
35 About this neo-Duhemian sense of idealization, see Sebastián, in García-Bermejo, 2009, p. 401.  
36 See Hua VI, § [9], (a), p. 25: “MeBkunst wird also zu Wegbereiterin der SchilieBlich universellen 
Geometrie und ihrer “Welt” reiner Limesgestalten”.   
37 There are millions of negligible aspects in the modeling of exchange that have not been “explicitly” 
isolated in the “story” of Kiyotaki and Wright, for example, whether the agents are handsome or ugly, 
that they do not suffer a disability of any kind, etc. In contrast, the fact of death makes an explicit refer-
ence to its isolation. If we asked ourselves about what factor plays a greater role in a commercial ex-
change in the life-world, whether the beauty of the agents or their mortality and, therefore, what is the 
factor that can be the best isolated in the idealization, surely we would find more than a theoretical 
problem. However, KW chose to make the elimination of death explicit and not to say anything about the 
isolation of other special characteristics of the agents. Therefore, we can assume that this explicitness 
obeys some kind of logic, whatever the extent to which this logic is not made explicit.  
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previous case, in virtue of a simplification in the application of the mathe-
matical apparatus to be used, since if we introduce the immortality of 
agents we can avoid distortions in the establishment of the calculus of the 
functions of utility and non-utility of the agents, on the one hand; and on 
the other, we stabilize the number of agents of each type I, II and III, and 
in this way the calculus of probability of encounters is also stabilized. 
However, if these were the only reasons, we would have to also include a 
clause on the birth of the agents (the model does not make this clause 
explicit), since this factor could also alter the factor of probability of the 
encounterings. The model KW talks about the “continuum” of agents as a 
“unity of mass”, implying a single fixed number and compact and stable 
whole of agents. However, the immortality and absence of birth of the 
agents in the model 38  is not the only modeling characteristic of the 
agents. The agents “meet each other”. This is the only relation between 
them. Production is understood as an absolutely individual factor, and the 
agents interact with each other having related meanings in which they ex-
change goods. This is a priori reasonable under the logic of the constitu-
tion of models: we want to show the emergence of the medium of ex-
change, and other related structures between the agents can and must be 
negligible. At the same time, one can interpret that the essential nucleus 
of the commercial exchange consists in the type of exchange we call 
“meeting”, and we can assume that all possible relations but “meeting” 
can be isolated. But in this case, the modeling structure of these encoun-
ters (its rhythmic pace organized into discreet time turns) implies that the 
probability that two agents meet again is zero39. No doubt, our extreme 
precautions would not be properly understood if it was understood that 
our aim is to denounce some “lack of empathy” or some other inappropri-
ate isolation in virtue of the exclusion of, for example, emotional factors or 
social ties in meetings. Staying in a modeling that isolates all emotional or 
 
 
38 Although birth is not made explicit as a modelized element, we have to assume that the same per-
spective must be assumed starting with the introduction of the sense of immortality. Or perhaps Kiyotaki 
and Wright have assumed that a world of immortal agents is a world in which no one would like to have 
children, and therefore one condition follows another in an immediate and obvious way? On the other 
hand, one might think that dying can be included as a complete cessation of “economizing actions”, the 
only ones in which the model is centered, while procreation can be immediately eliminated from “econ-
omizing actions”. Everything is open to interpretation, given that KW do not say anything about it; in 
any case, these issues would require some explicit demonstration in the development of the model.  
39 KW 1989, p. 931.  
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family ties between the agents, and accepting it as methodologically rea-
sonable, what should concern us is the explanation according to which the 
probability for two agents to meet again is zero: the elimination of the 
credit in the model. It is necessary to stress that we are not calling for the 
“humanity” of agents; that would be ignoring the precise meaning of what 
the concept of “model” ontologically means, nor the intentions of the re-
searchers who use those theoretical entities, attacking the processes of 
isolation and idealization by means of a critique aimed at adding convolu-
tions (sociological, psychological, institutional) on the aspects the scientist 
tries to isolate according to his theoretical interests. However, the denial 
of the possibility of credit in the model is not the isolation of a concrete 
social relation between agents among other possible social relations; it 
does not involve the isolation of an accidental relation to the phenomenon 
of money itself, which we want to explain. We are talking about a relation 
that all other monetarist traditions confound with the essence itself of the 
phenomenon of money. Actually, to eliminate credit from the concept of 
money in the model KW means that the probability of two agents who 
meet in a turn to meet again is zero. One could ponder whether what has 
been isolated in this logic of meetings is the notion of “society” itself. And 
to isolate, not this or that determined social factual relation (being part of 
a family, having emotional bonds, etc.), but the notion of “society” itself is 
possible that it implies to gain the description of the emergence of the 
medium of exchange in a possible world under the condition of not being 
able to obtain a theory in which the emergence of the medium of ex-
change, as well as its ties with the worldly concept of money become in-
telligible for individuals who belong to the real world (the “life-world”, as 
we would say phenomenologically). In order to eliminate the possibility of 
credit in the model (to “isolate” the function of medium of exchange from 
other functions), we eliminate the notion of “society” itself: two agents 
that meet in a turn have a zero probability of meeting again. With this, we 
might legitimately ponder about the possibility of recovering, some time, 
some empirical content from the model (or for the possibility of recovering 
the emergence of the medium of exchange for the life-world). We empha-
size that our criticism is not far from the same thematic area of money; 
the model KW requires from the beginning to forget any bond that the 
THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE CASE OF MONEY 215 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 215 
 
emerging medium of exchange could have with a “social” time. Even if it 
emerges from a series of stochastic processes, this medium of exchange is 
purely spatial; it does not have a temporal dimension. We could ponder 
whether a medium of exchange obtained at this price has something to do 
with the function of “medium of exchange” as we exert it daily in the life-
world; that is to say, we could ponder whether this medium of exchange 
has anything to do with the function of medium of exchange as it corre-
sponds to the phenomenon of money as it is experienced. And this is not 
precisely a “personalist” critique to economy40.      
2. Behavior: The model KW presents human behavior modeling according 
to two parameters: the theory of rational election and the theory of games. 
With regard to the rational to the theory of rational election, the agents are 
considered as rational maximizes: always and at all times every agent seeks to 
maximize its expected utility, and this maximization guides unilaterally his deci-
sion making. The theory of rational election is based upon the microeconomic 
formalization of a previously modeled behavior. These microeconomic formali-
zations, at their turn founded upon a previous idealization of behavior, are car-
ried out isolating some components of the decision making psychological and 
social process. But regarding this microeconomic formalization, based in its turn 
in the idealization of certain psychological aspects of decision making, we could 
ponder: Is it legitimate to model the psychic processes of decision making in 
the same way that the natural sciences model the space-time phenomena with 
which they must operate? Can we talk about concepts such as ideal perfect flu-
id or gas, habitually used in physics, and say that there is some analog rela-
tionship with concepts such as those defined by consumer preferences and in-
come, or governments uniquely represented by fiscal or monetary variables?41 
From the purely formal point of view, we give a positive answer: there is no 
pure fluid in nature, although the theoretic study of the properties of a perfect 
fluid can lead to laws that applied to real fluids, can help us explain or predict 
 
 
40 In a sense, the KW model evolution in the last 20 years confirms the “artificial” character of this medi-
um of exchange: instead of evolving toward an incorporation of institutional or closer to the real world 
elements (working in an interdisciplinary direction to reconcile the more formal aspects of the model by 
introducing concepts from other social sciences), the model has evolved into theoretical proposals that 
attempt to broaden its field of action in completely created computer simulations, or what has been 
called “artificial societies”; that is to say, instead of advancing in the direction of modeling the formal 
nucleus of the model, progress has been made in the direction of “modeling” all the surrounding aspects, 
including the notion of society; see Elendner, 2009.  
41 This analogy can be found in Santos, in García-Bermejo, 2009, p. 242.  
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quite approximately the experimental results; likewise, it will be said, in reality 
consumers are not defined solely by their preferences and income, but to as-
sume a human action of this kind should allow us to explain or predict some 
accurate experimental results. But, is it really the case in the example we are 
analyzing of the model KW about the emergence of money?42 Are the results of 
the KW model recoverable to establish or construct some explanation or predic-
tion in the real world? If the constitution of a perfect fluid by means of idealiz-
ing processes allows for laws applicable to the explanation of predictive behav-
ior of real fluids, it is because the idealization of a perfect fluid is carried out 
isolating factors that belong to the same ontological regional level. The viscosi-
ty, rotational character or compressibility of a liquid are factors that can be iso-
lated in the idealization of a perfect fluid, but a perfect fluid is nothing else than 
a real “polished” liquid from the worldly conditions that impose restrictions of 
measurement and prediction. In a sense, in the example of fluid mechanics we 
still move in the direction of the neo-Duhemian sense of “idealization”, previ-
ously discussed. However, when we model human decision making in the con-
stitution of these economic models, do what is obtained and what is isolated 
still belong to the same ontological regional level? Is the relationship between a 
medium of exchange obtained by emergence from some immortal, sterile 
agents that can never be found more than once, and a medium of exchange, 
for example an act of buying, such as the one we might find in its constitutive 
spatial levels in the life-world, a relationship between two theoretical entities 
that belong to the same regional and ontological level? Hastily assuming a posi-
tive answer implies once again to forget that the model KW is not a model 
about the emergence of money, but about the emergence of the function of the 
medium of exchange, and that if the demonstration of this function can be car-
ried out, it is at the price of having previously isolated it from other functions of 
money, from which the model simply does not affirm anything. Regarding the 
question of whether the modeling behavior and the behavior obtained by 
means of the recourse to phenomenological description of the life-world belong 
to the same regional and ontological level, we call upon Husserl again: 
 
 
42 We are not criticizing the possibilities of empirical contrast of models in general (in fact, I am far from 
having accurate information about it); our view is restricted to the KW model now, as a step towards a 
global theory of money using the medium of exchange function.  
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 “The idea of an ontology of the world, the idea of an objective, universal 
science supported by a universal a priori according to which all possible factual 
world was knowable more geometric – an idea available from Leibniz – is non-
sense. In the area of souls (Seelen), in principle, there is no such ontology; 
there is no science of the ideal and physicist type, even if psychic being can be 
studied in transcendental universality and in a systematic way, and in the main 
essential generality in the form of an a priori science.”43      
3. A condition of equilibrium: The concept of equilibrium implies an as-
sumption in the way in which the agents are going to behave, and this behavior 
is based here in the theory of games. The notion of equilibrium is introduced as 
a model resolution clause, and in the model KW it depends on the distinction 
between fundamental strategies and speculative strategies. In this case, the 
whole question of the ontology of modes of being of things has been absorbed 
in the theory of strategic behavior stipulated by the model.  
 
Concluding: the Kiyotaki – Wright model has managed to show that, if 
money was a medium of exchange, it could exist in a possible world. Some see 
this as a breakthrough in the orthodox analysis of money44; others, more cau-
tious, limit their view to the confirmation of the possibility of an “old intui-
tion”45. Whatever the scope we give to this model, we must point out that we 
are not in front of an isolated theory of money, but in front of a theory about 
one of the isolated and modeling functions of money. As we have seen, the 
model KW leaves the question about the genetic ancestry of these issues in 
relation to other functions absolutely intact. 
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